Environmental regulators often have imperfect information about regulated rms' abatement costs. In this paper we compare taxes and emissions permits in a dynamic setting in which r m s behave strategically. The regulator updates policyover time based upon previous aggregate industry performance, assuming that rms are not strategic. We nd that strategic rms facing an emissions tax have an incentive to overabate in order to obtain a lower tax in the future. Firms that trade emissions permits have a strategic incentive t o r e v eal an arti cially high permit price to obtain more permits in the future. Whether permitsortaxes are preferred from a welfare standpoint depends upon how permitprices are determined. Taxes generate higher welfare when the low-cost rm sets the permit price but permits generate higher welfare when the high-cost rm sets the permit price.
Introduction
Seldom does an environmental regulator know a s m uch about regulated rms' abatement costs as do the rms themselves. This informational asymmetry constitutes one of the great di culties of policymaking, for it implies that rms may h a ve both the opportunity and the incentive to exploit their advantage to undermine the intended goals of a well-meaning regulator.
Even if rms do not take a d v antage of their knowledge, a regulator's uncertainty about industry costs can lead to ine cient policies. In an early paper devoted to this matter, Weitzman 12] investigated whether, in the presence of uncertainty, price or quantity controls are preferable. Weitzman showed that a quantity instrument (resp. a price instrument) is preferred if the marginal bene t curve is steeper than (resp. less steep than) marginal costs. 1 Weitzman's model is static, so rms cannot strategically manipulate the regulator's beliefs about costs via their abatement strategy. Kwerel 7] developed a hybrid price-quantity instrument that induces competitive rms to reveal their true costs to the regulator, who then implements a rst-best outcome. More recently, Kaplow and Shavell 6] claimed that the rst-best outcome can also be achieved with a nonlinear tax set equal to the (nonlinear) pollution damage function. Whether schemes that are more involved than simple linear tax or quantity instruments could be implemented in practice is an open question.
While these models are static, the world is not and it seems reasonable to ask whether informational asymmetry plays a di erent role in dynamic models. In recent y ears, a number of articles have appeared that take up this question. Following Weitzman's lead, Newell and Pizer 8] and Hoel and Karp 5] investigated the e ect of stock pollutants on the price-quantity question. As with the static models, they found that taxes are preferred to quotas when the slope of the marginal abatement costs is large relative to the slope of the marginal damages. In addition, taxes dominate if the discount rate is high or the pollution stock has a high decay rate. Their results are robust to changes in parameter values but conditional on the assumption of quadratic functions and additive uncertainty. Baldursson and von der Fehr 3] found that, in a dynamic and uncertain model, any irreversibility in abatement decisions can a ect policy choice generally as well as the price-quantity comparison. 2 In a paper that extends Kwerel's model to a dynamic setting, Benford 4] showed that when rms are perfectly competitive (that is, non-strategic), the natural extension of Kwerel's scheme can induce the optimal trajectory of abatement over time.
To our knowledge, in all of the work that compares price and quantity instruments in a dynamic setting, it is assumed that rms are non-strategic price takers. It is the regulator who adopts sophisticated dynamic policy rules in order to induce a pliant, non-strategic polluting sector to achieve socially desirable outcomes. Though it has produced many important insights, it would appear that this approach runs counter to Weitzman's assumption about who holds the advantage in the interaction between regulator and polluters. If polluting rms have the informational advantage and are large enough to realize that their actions can in uence regulatory outcomes, it would seem natural to study a dynamic policy setting in which they are also more sophisticated than the regulator.
In the present paper we set out to do just that. First, we d e v elop a dynamic two-period model of environmental regulation in which two regulated rms are able to manipulate the regulator. We then extend the model to T periods, where T is possibly in nite. The regulator knows the function describing abatement bene ts, but faces uncertainty regarding the rms' abatement costs. Two policy instruments are compared: emissions taxes and emissions permits. In each case, the regulator sets the policy in the rst period so that marginal bene ts equal her expectation of industry marginal abatement costs. In each subsequent period, the regulator adjusts the policy based on observed price and quantity in the preceding period.
We assume that the regulator follows a mechanical but natural rule for updating the policy from one periodto the next. Speci cally, she believes that the rms are non-strategic and will behave so that marginal cost equals the tax (in the case of emissions taxes) or the permit price (in the case of emissions permits). Having observed the rms' behavior in period t, the regulator derives a new estimate of marginal costs and sets the policy in period t +1 so that marginal bene ts equal the new expected marginal cost function. A k ey assumption is that the rms know this rule, and that their behavior in each period optimally anticipates the e ect of their action on the policy in the following period. The regulator, then, is at a disadvantage in two respects. First, she is uncertain about the rm's abatement cost functions. Second, while the rms knows the regulator's dynamic rule, it is assumed that the regulator does not anticipate the rms' manipulation of the rule.
Though the regulator in this model is relatively unsophisticated compared to the rms, there are several situations in which this may bea close re ection of reality. If a given policy includes a grandfathering provision, polluters might be able to a ect their treatment under the anticipated regulatory policyin the future by modifying their behavior today. One could also think of our regulator's adjustment rule as a legislative mandate or statute that rms in the a ected industry can in uence through their actions. However one chooses to interpret the regulator's rule, it should bekept in mind that there is an important di erence between our model, and that of Kwerel 7] and others in the mechanism-design literature. In mechanism design, the regulator implements a mechanism for which it is optimal for rms to reveal information truthfully. In our model, rms must deliberately alter their behavior to send an incorrect signal regarding their costs. In this way our model resembles that of Weitzman 13] , who examined the \ratchet e ect" and described optimal policy for an enterprise whose future performance targets are based on current performance. In a paper that is perhaps most similar to ours, Andersson 2] applied the ratchet idea to pollution control. He considered only a permit scheme, however, while we compare permits and taxes, and his rms were able to collude in reaching their trading decisions while ours cannot. We derive two main sets of results. The rst concerns the level of emissions in the tax and permits cases. On one hand, rms facing an emissions tax have a strategic incentive t o o verabate, pretending that their costs are low. The regulator, then, believing that the rms have l o w abatement costs, sets a relatively low tax. But overabatement is expensive, and the dynamic problem facing the rms requires balancing the desire to appear to have low costs against the desire to minimize actual abatement costs. On the other hand, rms facing a permit market have a strategic incentive to reveal a high permit price. The regulator, believing then that the rms have high abatement costs, issues more permits in the next period.
In the two-period model with emissions taxes, we show that rms overabate in the rst period and underabate in the second period relative to non-strategic rms. In the steady-state equilibrium of the in nite-horizon model, rms overabate and face lower taxes relative to non-strategic rms. The results for the permit case are both more complicated and less general. The complexity arises because rms have di erent i n c e n tives on how to manipulate permit price depending upon whether they are a buyer or a seller of permits. All rms have a strategic incentive to set high permit prices because this leads the regulator to believe that abatement costs are high and to allocate more permitsinthenextperiod. However, a rm that buys permits wants the price to below i n order to reduce the cost of permit purchases. Whether permit price is set above or below marginal abatement cost depends on whether the high-cost rm (likely buyer) or low-cost rm (likely seller) has more in uence in determining the permit price. When the high-cost rm sets the permit price and the price e ect dominates the strategic e ect, the permit price will be set below marginal abatement cost. Otherwise, the permit price will be set above marginal abatement cost. In a steady-state equilibrium, if the permit price is set above (below) marginal abatement cost, the numberofpermits allocated by the regulator will be more (less) than the e cient level and rms will abate less (more) than the e cient amount. To demonstrate the range of possible outcomes, we solve two polar opposite cases: one in which t h e low-cost rm is a monopoly seller of permits and sets the permit price, and one in which the high-cost rm is a monopsony buyer of permits and sets the permit price.
The second set of results, comparing welfare under permits and taxes, is derived from a numerical simulation of the multi-period model. Even with linear marginal bene t and marginal cost functions, the dynamic model becomes unwieldy, with fourth-order polynomials describing the objective function in the rst period of a two-period model. Because analytic solutions are unavailable, and because we want to go beyond comparative statics to compare welfare levels, we conduct a series of numerical exercises aimed at comparing the two policy instruments. The numerical results highlight the importance of the way in which the market permitprice is determined in choosing between the two policyinstruments. We nd that when the low-cost rm sets the permit price, taxes outperform permits in terms of welfare. On the other hand, when the high-cost rm sets the permit price, permits outperform taxes. These results hold regardless of whether marginal cost is steeper or atter than marginal bene t.
The Two-Period Model
There are two rms, one with high abatement costs and the other with low abatement costs, indexed by j = h l. There are two time periods, indexed by t = 1 2. Let be the discount factor between periods. Initial emissions (without any costly abatement activity) by r m j in period t are e j t . Let abatement by r m j in period t beq j t . The abatement cost function for rm j is given by C j (q j t ). Here, is a realization of a random variable , which is known to the rms but not known by the regulator. We assume that the marginal abatement cost function for each rm is positive and increasing in abatement (C j q (q j t ) > 0 and C j(q j t ) > 0) and that C j (0 ) = 0 . We assume that increases in result in higher total and marginal abatement cost at all levels of abatement: cost of achieving aggregate abatement in period t, where aggregate abatement is q t = q h t + q l t . Let C q (q t ) represent the marginal aggregate abatement cost function, assumed to be continuous.
De ne E C q (q t ) ] a s t h e expected marginal abatement cost function when information about the realization of the random variable is unknown. Bene ts of abatement in period t are B(q t ). We assume that the marginal bene ts of abatement are positive but declining in aggregate abatement: B 0 (q t ) > 0 and B 00 (q t ) < 0. To ensure an interior optimum, we assume that C q (0 ) < B 0 (0) for all in the support of .
Prior to the rst period, the regulator chooses a type of policy, either emissions taxes or marketable emissions permits. In period 1, she sets the level of emission taxes or the numberof permits issued to each rm. Firms then choose period1abatement (and emissions trading). The regulator observes each rm's abatement l e v el and, in the case of marketable emissions permits, the price of permits. She then updates her belief about and, based upon the rms' behavior, infers that the value of the random variable is R . In the second period, the regulator again sets the level of emission taxes or the numberof permits issued to each rm, this time using information gathered from observing rst-period emissions and prices. Firms then choose period 2 abatement (and emissions trading).
The goal of each rm is to minimize the present value of costs (abatement plus regulatory costs). Firms are strategic in that they take account of how rst-period actions may in uence future regulatory policy.
The regulator's objective is to maximize the expected present v alue of net social bene ts (i.e., minimize the sum of damages from pollution and abatement cost). In our model, the regulator is not strategic in the same way that rms are. In each period, she sets marginal bene t equal to expected marginal cost and sets policy accordingly. The regulator uses a non-strategic updating of beliefs in period 2 that fails to account for the rms' strategic behavior.
Emissions taxes
In the rst period, the regulator chooses an emissions tax, p When the regulator expects costs to be low (a low value of R ), marginal cost equals marginal bene t at high levels of abatement. In the second period the regulator will choose to set the emissions tax equal to marginal bene ts: p 2 = B 0 (q 2 ). Di erentiating this expression with respect to q 2 yields dp 2 dq 2 = B 00 (q 2 ) < 0: 8 Therefore, we h a ve g 0 (q 1 j p 1 ) < 0.
Q.E.D.
Because rms are strategic, they will take account of how t h e regulator responds to the rstperiodchoice of abatement. The two-period total cost for rm j is 
where q ;j 1 denotes the vector q 1 with the j th component removed. Note that there is limited strategic interaction between rms in this problem. When the second periodarrives, the tax p 2 has been set and both rms act as price takers. Therefore, in period 2 a rm does not care what its rival chooses to abate. In period 1, however, rms wish to manipulate the regulator's belief about to obtain more favorable tax treatment in the second period. The regulator bases p 2 upon aggregate observed rst-period abatement. The rms choose q j 1 simultaneously and in the Nash equilibrium of this game each fails to account for the bene t that its own overabatement confers on the other rm. Thus, they do not achieve the collusive abatement levels. Importantly, neither do they seek to manipulate the other rm's second-period behavior through their choice of Note that with non-strategic rms p 2 will be the e cient tax level because the regulator can correctly infer marginal costs by observing abatement in the rst period. Proposition 2. In a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game with emissions taxes, rms will overabate in the rst period relative to equilibrium with non-strategic rms. In addition, rms will face lower taxes in the second period and underabate in the second period relative to the e cient outcome. Proof ) > 0 for both j , it must be true that q j 1 >q j 1 . From Proposition 1, higher rst-period abatement yields a lower second-period emissions tax. Because the tax is lower in the second period, abatement will also be lower than it would have been with non-strategic rms. Q.E.D.
Marketable emissions permits
Let a t equal the total numberof marketable emissions permits allocated by the regulator in periodt, and let a j t equal the number of permits allocated to rm j in period t, with a h t + a l t = a t . We assume that the regulator follows a rule for allocating the permits between the two rms the rule is common knowledge. Firms are not allowed either to borrow permits in the rst period or to bank them for future use. In each period, total emissions must not exceed total marketable emissions permits: or e t ; q t a t . In equilibrium, these expressions will hold with equality there will be no unused permits.
In the rst period, the regulator sets a 1 so that marginal bene ts equal expected marginal costs: B 0 (e 1 ; a 1 ) = E C q ((e 1 ; a 1 ) )]. Firms then choose their individual abatement levels and trade permits. The regulator observes the market permitprice, p a 1 . The regulator believes that rms trade so that the market permit price equals the marginal cost of abatement, and hence that p a 1 = C q ((e 1 ; a 1 ) ). From this belief, the regulator infers that the realization of is R . She then sets the second-period total allocation of permits, a 2 = h(p a 1 j a 1 ), so that B 0 (e 2 ; a 2 ) = C q ((e 2 ; a 2 ) R ). In the rst period, the regulator believes that abatement i s c hosen such t h a t C q ((e 1 ;a 1 ) R ) = p a 1 .
Totally di erentiating this equation with respect to p a 1 and R yields dp a 1 = C q ((e 1 ; a 1 ) R )d R which i n t u r n l e a d s t o d R dp a 1 = 1 C q (q 1 R ) > 0: High prices for permits in period 1 are a signal to the regulator of high cost (i.e., a high value of R ).
In the second period, the regulator wants abatement levels to satisfy B 0 (e 2 ; a 2 ) = C q ((e 2 ;
a 2 ) R ). Totally di erentiating B 0 (e 2 ; a 2 ) = C q ((e 2 ; a 2 ) R ) with respect to a 2 and R yields When the regulator expects costs to be high (that is, when she observes a high value of R ), marginal cost equals marginal bene t at low l e v els of abatement o r h i g h l e v els of emissions, so the regulator allots a high numberofpermits. Therefore, we h a ve h 0 (p a 1 j a 1 ) > 0. Q.E.D. Proposition 3 shows that rms have a strategic incentive to set high prices in order to get the regulator to allocate more permits in the next period. Note that the strategic e ect with marketable emissions permits works in the opposite direction of the e ect in the case with emissions taxes, as shown in Proposition 1. To receive more lenient regulatory treatment with marketable emissions permits, the rms try to convince the regulator that abatement costs are high. When the regulator believes that abatement costs are high, she will allocate more permits in the following period. In contrast, for the case with emissions taxes, rms try to convince the regulator that abatement costs are low, leading her to set low taxes in the following period.
The analysis of equilibrium in the case of marketable emissions permits is complicated by the fact that rms interact with each other in the permit market, as well as with the regulator. Trading in the permit market gives rise to another set of incentives about where to set the price. A rm that sells permits prefers high permit prices while a rm that buys permits would prefer a low permit price. Further, the numberof permits allocated in a periodmay a ect the resulting equilibrium price and the division of rents between rms. Thus, it is not clear how the equilibrium outcome and the e cient outcome compare.
In the permit market the two rms are engaged in a bilateral monopoly game. There is, of course, no unique solution to a bilateral monopoly. We consider two extreme cases. In one case the low-cost rm sets the price at which trades may occur. 3 Because the low-cost rm is typically a seller of permits, this case is akin to monopoly. In the other case, the high-cost rm sets the permit price. Because the high-cost rm is typically a buyer of permits, this case is akin to monopsony. In actual bargaining situations, typically both rms would have a degree of bargaining power and the price would re ect the bargaining power of each rm.
In each period, the rm setting the price is the price leader, denoted with superscript L, a n d the other rm is the follower, denoted with superscript F . In the second period, the problem facing the follower, given an allocation of permits a F 2 and facing permit price p 2 , is to maximize the net permit revenue minus abatement c o s t : The solution to this problem involves setting the permit price equal to marginal abatement cost. Let q F t (p t ) be the abatement level that equates marginal abatement cost and price for given price p t in period t. Because marginal abatement cost is increasing, @ q F 2 =@ p 2 > 0. The leader takes account of the follower's reaction when setting the price. Using the fact that total emissions will equal total marketable permits, so that q L 2 = e 2 ; a 2 ; q F 2 (p 2 ), the dynamic programming equation for the leader is: 
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The right side of this equation represents the net purchases of the follower, which will be positive if the follower is a net buyer and negative if the follower is a net seller. The leader will set the price above ( b e l o w) its marginal abatement cost when it sells to (buys from) the follower.
The regulator sets the second-period allocation of permits based on the period 1 price: a 2 = h(p 1 j a 1 ). In period 1, p 1 is taken as given by the follower so the follower cannot in uence the period 2 allocation of permits. Therefore, the follower will again choose abatement so that marginal abatement cost equals price. 
Rearranging the rst-order conditions for this problem yields
The second term on the right side of this equation, which did not appear in the equivalent expression in the solution from the second period, is the strategic regulatory term. From Proposition 3 we know that @ h (p 1 j a 1 )=@p 1 > 0. Typically, @ V L 2 (a 2 )=@a 2 > 0, which means that more permits are good for a rm's bottom line. But this result need not always hold. For example, when a leader sells permits to a follower with very steep marginal abatement costs, the leader may be better o when obtaining fewer permits in the second period. With few permits, the equilibrium permit price may be quite high. If demand for permits is highly inelastic, the revenue e ect may o u t weigh the direct e ect from the rm having fewer permits, either to sell or to use. Because the signs of both bracketed terms on the right-hand side of equation (3) are ambiguous, it is not possible to say for sure whether the leader will set price above or below marginal abatement cost in the rst period. We explore this issue further using simulations in section 4.
The T -Period Model
In this section we analyze a case with T periods, t = 1 2 : : : T , where T is possibly in nite. We seek to determine the degree to which the main results of the two-period model continue to hold as the time horizon is extended. We retain all of the structure of the two-period model, except that the time horizon is lengthened.
Emissions taxes 13
We assume that in each periodthe regulator sets the tax based on an assessment of , now denoted R t , which is based only upon the abatement quantity observed in the previous period: p t+1 = g(q t j p t ). Note that this is analogous to the two-period model, where p 2 = g(q 1 j p 1 ). As in the two-period model, we continue to assume that neither the bene tfunction nor the cost functions change from period to period.
The problem facing the two rms is set up as a dynamic programming problem. In period T , rm j's problem is The nal term in this equation is the strategic term, which captures the value to the rm of in uencing the emissions tax in the next period by choice of current abatement. This term is positive because @ V j T (p T )=@p T < 0, as shown above, and @ p T =@q j T ;1 < 0 by Proposition 1. In equilibrium, each rm sets abatement so that marginal abatement cost exceeds the emissions tax. As in the rst period of the two-period model, rms overabate relative to non-strategic rms in the penultimate period.
Extending the analysis to period T ;2, the problem facing the rm with three periods remaining is, 
Except for the di erence in time subscripts, this condition is identical to that shown for the problem beginning in period T ; 1. The strategic term is again positive because @ V j T ;1 (p T ;1 )=@p T ;1 < 0, as can beseen by inspecting equation (4), and because @ p T ;1 =@ q j T ;2 < 0. The latter inequality holds because the regulator sets p T ;1 based on her belief about cost that are xed by abatement inperiodT ; 2. Higher abatement leads the regulator to believe that costs are lower and therefore to set a lower emissions tax in the next period. In an equilibrium in period T ; 2, each rm sets its level of abatement so that its marginal abatement cost exceeds the emissions tax, just as in period T ; 1. In general, at the start of time period t, the problem facing a rm is The necessary condition for an interior solution is identical to equation (5), again except for the time subscripts. As a consequence, at any time t < T , each rm sets its emissions so that its marginal abatement cost exceeds the emissions tax. Because each rm does this, it follows that the aggregate marginal cost exceeds the emissions tax: C q ; q j t > p t . We can use this result to show that in a steady state, where prices and emissions do not change from period to period, rms will abate more than is e cient.
Proposition 4. In a steady-state equilibrium with emissions taxes, rms abate more than is ecient.
Proof: For a given value of , de ne q as the e cient level of abatement (for which B 0 (q ) = C q (q )) and de ne p as the emissions tax that would induce non-strategic rms to set the e cient level of abatement, (p = B 0 (q ) = C q (q )). De ne q s as the steady-state level of abatement and p s as the steady-state emissions tax according to the regulator's updating rule. An argument similar to that following equation (5) ensures that C q (q s ) > p s . The regulator sets p s so that p s = B 0 (q s ) = C q (q s R ), where R is the regulator's steady-state belief about . Therefore, C q (q s ) > B 0 (q s ). Finally, because C> 0 and B 00 < 0, we know that q s > q .
Q.E.D.
The intuition for Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 1 . Firms abate at q s > q because doing so makes the regulator believe t h a t marginal abatement costs are C q (q R ), leading the regulator to set the emissions tax at p s < p . The losses incurred by the rms due to overabatement are more than recovered through lower future taxes.
Marketable emissions permits
As was true for emissions taxes, the T -period model with marketable emissions permits di ers from the two-period model only in the longer time horizon. The regulator sets the number of permitsin period t based on R t , her beliefabout , which is in turn based on the permit price and the numberofpermits allocated in the previous period: a t = h(p t ;1 j a t;1 ) . We analyze the T -period model with marketable emissions permits using dynamic programming.
In period t, the follower faces a price set by the leader. Because the regulator responds only to the price and not the volume of trade, the follower's best response is to set marginal abatement cost equal to price. As in the two-period model, the right-hand side may be either positive or negative so that the emissions price is set either higher or lower than marginal abatement cost. In a steady-state equilibrium, if price is set above marginal abatement cost, then more than the e cient number of permits will be distributed and too little abatement will occur relative to the e cient amount. On the other hand, if price is set below marginal abatement cost, then too few permits will be distributed and more than the e cient a m o u n t of pollution will be abated.
Numerical Optimization and Results
The di culty of this problem precludes us from comparing analytically the welfare outcomes of taxes and permits over a long time horizon. Firms fold the reaction of the regulator into their objective functions. Even in a two-period model with a quadratic objective function (linear marginal cost and marginal bene t), solving for equilibrium involves fourth-order polynomial expressions. We therefore turn to numerical optimization in order to compare optimal rm behavior, regulator response, and welfare over a T -period horizon. In particular, we specify cost and bene t functions and employ the technique of iterating on the value function, simultaneously obtaining optimal rm behavior as the solution to the dynamic game in each period. In this section we describe this approach in more detail for both the taxes and permits case, and then turn to the results of this numerical exercise. 4 We vary the parameters , , v, and e (the total unregulated emissions, where e j = e ;j = e=2) in order to explore their e ects on the regulator's policies, optimal rm response, and overall welfare of using either a tax or a tradeable permit system. In the permits case, we explore two regimes: (1) the leader is the low-cost rm (b L = 1 :5, b F = 3) and (2) the leader is the high-cost rm (b L = 3 , b F = 1 :5).
Optimization methods
For boththe taxes and permits cases, we compute the dynamic programming equation and associated policy function in each period over a 20-year horizon by iterating backwards on the value function. A discrete grid size is chosen for the relevant state variable (p for the tax case and a for the permit case), and a hill-climbing algorithm is used to maximize the objective function, where we use a cubic spline interpolation to evaluate points between the discrete grid values. All calculations are performed in MATLAB. 5 The next two subsections are devoted to explaining brie y the numerical optimization procedure employed for each case (taxes and permits).
Numerical optimization: Taxes
Computing the quantities of interest in the tax and permits cases involves solving for the value function and associated policy function in every periodusing backwards induction. When the regulator uses taxes as her instrument, the period t state variable for each rm is the current emissions tax, p t . The control variable for rm j (j 2 fh lg) is the level of abatement in that period, q j t . Numerically iterating on the value function using backwards induction involves the following steps:
1. In the nal period, T (which equals 20 in this experiment), rm j 's dynamic programming equation is where each rm is assumed to know the continuation value, V j T (p T ). Firm j must now consider two quantities in its choice of abatement: (1) the current payo , and (2) the e ect that its choice of abatement this periodwill have on the tax next period. In this model we assume the regulator believes rms are acting non-strategically. Speci cally, rm j knows that the regulator will set p T where M B = E M C ]. That is, in any period t, the regulator's rule for setting the future tax is p t+1 = ( v(p t ; B q t ) ; B w )=(v ; B ). Both rms know this and, given abatement by the other rm (q ;j T ;1 ), rm j can solve its problem. The Nash equilibrium of this game yields the abatement levels for both rms given p T ;1 . Therefore, for period T ; 1 we h a ve the policy functions q j T ;1 (p T ;1 ) and the value functions V j T ;1 (p T ;1 ). 18 3. Knowing V j T ;1 (p T ;1 ) for both rms, we repeat the preceding step to compute q j T ;2 (p T ;2 ) a n d V j T ;2 (p T ;2 ). This backwards induction procedure is continued back to period1. Through this exercise, we have discovered how each rm optimally responds, in any period t, to the emissions tax set by the regulator in that period, p t . 4. To determine welfare, we need a value of the emissions tax in the rst period, p 1 , which is determined by the regulator as if = 0 . For each set of parameter values, this tax is calculated and the taxes and emissions are simulated over the 20-year horizon. Welfare is calculated as the net present v alue of the stream of total bene ts less aggregate total cost.
Numerical optimization: Tradeable permits
The permit case is very similar to the tax case, with one simpli cation: computing the Nash equilibrium is not required, because the follower rm (j = F ) takes the permitprice set by the leader rm (j = L) a s g i v en and does not attempt to manipulate future behavior of the regulator. When the regulator uses permits as the instrument to reduce pollution, the leader's period t state variable is the total allocation of permits, a t , and the leader's control variable is the permit price, p t . Again, we will solve this dynamic optimization problem by v alue function iteration starting at periodT . The procedure is as follows:
1. As in the tax case, the state space is discretized into a grid and cubic spline interpolation is used to evaluate points between the discrete grid values of a. In period T , the follower solves: The leader chooses p T in the period T dynamic programming equation:
This calculation produces the optimal period T policy function for the leader, p T (a T ), and the periodT value function for the leader, to be used in the calculation for period T ; 1.
2.
Stepping back one period, the future value function is known. Furthermore, the follower still acts non-strategically, and therefore has the same policy response as in period T , q F T ;1 (p T The leader must now consider not only its current-period payo , but the e ect that a current choice p T ;1 will have on the future allocation of permits, a T . The leader also knows that the regulator acts non-strategically in this fashion. That is, the regulator sets the new allocation of permits (a T in this case) where marginal bene t equals expected marginal cost. In particular, the regulator's updating rule is as follows: a t+1 (a t p t ) = p t + B a t ; w ; v e B ; v :
The leader's knowledge of the regulator's updating rule is very important, as this rm now knows exactly how its current choice of permit price (p T ;1 ) a ects the continuation value of the program. The rm solves the dynamic programming equation above, and obtains the policy function p T ;1 (a T ;1 ) and the resultant v alue function V L T ;1 (a T ;1 ). 3. This procedure is continued backwards to the rst period. The initial allocation of permits, a 1 , is chosen by the regulator as if = 0, and the permit market is simulated forward 20 periods.
Results of numerical optimization
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the results for the 20-period dynamic programming problem under both taxes and permits assuming the following parameter values: v = ;1, e j = e ;j = 2 5 ( e = 50), = 1 and = 2 . Figure 2 shows abatement quantity i n e a c h time period for four cases: a) taxes, b) permits when the low-cost rm sets permit price (b L = 1:5, b F = 3), c) permits when the high-cost rm sets permit price (b L = 3, b F = 1:5, and d) the optimal solution. In the optimal solution, abatement is such that the marginal bene t and the marginal cost of abatement are equal: w +vq= ( +d) + B q . With these parameter values, the optimal solution involves setting abatement in each period equal to 19.
In the tax case, abatement in period 1 is equal to 26.31, falls to 23.19 in period 2, stays then until the nal period, then drops to 14.81. With the exception of the nal period, rms abate more than in the optimal solution. Overabatement i s c a u s e d b y rms choosing to increase abatement t o 20 obtain low taxes in the next period. In the nal period, there is no incentive to overabate, and rms in fact underabate relative to what is optimal. With permits, the regulator allocates 30 permits in the initial period. This xes rst-period abatement at 20. After the rst period,abatement quantity di ers depending upon whether the low-cost rm or the high-cost rm sets permitprice. When the low-cost rm sets permit price, abatement quantity settles to a value of 14.69 after a few periods. When the high-cost rm sets permit price, abatement quantity settles to 17.84 after a f e w periods. With permits, rms have a strategic incentive to set high permit prices to obtain more permits in the next period. Monopoly pricing reinforces the strategic incentive to set high prices when the low-cost rm sets prices, which results in a large allotment o f permits and low abatement. When the high-cost rm is the leader, the strategic impulse to set high prices is o set somewhat. This results in lower permit prices, fewer permits allocated in subsequent periods, and more abatement, than in the case in which the low-cost rm sets prices. Even when the high-cost rm sets prices, however, abatement is lower than the optimal level. Figure 3 shows welfare in each period for each of the four cases (optimal solution, taxes, permitswith the low-cost rm setting the price, and permits with the high-cost rm setting the price). With the parameter values assumed in this example, welfare is highest in the case with permits where the high-cost rm sets price. The deadweight loss in this case is quite small. The present value of welfare in the optimal solution over the entire 20-year horizon is 7,220. For the case with permits where the high-cost rm sets price, the present value of welfare is 7,092. The deadweight loss for this case is only 1.8%. The present value of welfare under emissions taxes is 6,818 (deadweight loss of 5.6%). Welfare is lowest under permits where the low-cost rm set prices. The present value of welfare in this case is 6,499 (deadweight loss of 10.7%). Regarding welfare generated per period, the order of the cases is consistent for all periods except the rst. Inperiods 2 through 20, welfare is highest under permits when the high-cost rm sets permit price, followed next by taxes, and then by permits when the low-cost rm sets permit price.
In the rst period, however, welfare is higher under permits than under taxes regardless of which rm sets the permit price. Firms cannot manipulate the number of permits allocated in the rst period, which limits rst-period deadweight loss. Almost all of the deadweight loss in the rst period is due to di erent marginal abatement costs for the two rms. In contrast, under emissions taxes rms set rst-period abatement higher than in any other period. Firms do so to decrease the regulator's belief about , which results in the regulator choosing a low tax in the next period. Once the regulator believes that is low, the rms do not need to abate as much in order to maintain that belief. If we had chosen a time horizon short enough to give the rst period a dominant role, welfare would have beenhigher under permits than under taxes regardless of which rm had set the permit price.
For the parameter values chosen in this example, rms overabate in steady state when taxes are used (consistent with Proposition 4), and underabate when permits are used. Perhaps a more striking result is that steady-state welfare comparisons appear to hinge on whether the low-or the high-cost rm sets the price in the permit market. To explore whether this result is a peculiarity o f these speci c parameter values or is more robust, we compare steady-state abatement and welfare for an in nite-horizon problem over a range of parameter values. In all, ten cases are explored under di erent values of the intercept term for the marginal abatement cost ( ), the slope of the marginal bene t of abatement (v), and the total unregulated emissions (e). Table I provides a description of each of the ten cases and gives the steady-state abatement levels for the optimal solution, the case with taxes, and the two cases with permits. 6 Consistent with Proposition 4, in all cases using taxes as the instrument leads to overabatement in the steady state. As noted in section 3.2, the determination of whether rms overabate or underabate when permits are used depends on the magnitude of the strategic term. Typically, as suggested earlier, the value of a rm's optimal program will beincreased by an increase in the total allocation of permits, meaning that price is set above marginal abatement cost, and too little abatement will occur. Although the opposite result can be achieved in theory, for all parameter values explored in this exercise rms underabate when strategically interacting in a permit market. Table II compares steady-state welfare levels for the various regulatory regimes. Following Weitzman 12] one might expect that the relative slopes of the marginal bene t and marginal cost functions determine whether taxes or permits yield the higher welfare level. This is not the case for the examples explored here. Consistent with the example in Figure 3 , we nd that the dominance of taxes over permits depends entirely on the abatement costs of the leader and follower rms in the permit market. For all ten cases, when the leader has high costs (relative to the follower), permits dominate taxes in terms of welfare the opposite is true with a low-cost leader.
Conclusions
When an environmental regulator does not have complete information about rms' abatement costs, the rms can use this informational asymmetry to their advantage. Firms know that their behavior in a given time period is a signal of costs to the regulator, and that she takes this behavior into account when making policies in subsequent periods. We h a ve explored the e ects of this strategic behavior on the price-quantity comparison.
With an emissions tax, rms have a strategic incentive t o overabate in order to obtain a low tax in the next period. With permits, rms have a strategic incentive to set the permit price high in order to obtain a large number of permits in the next period, leading to underabatement. Though a permit buyer has an incentive t o l o wer the price in order to make purchasing less expensive, in of the cases we examined the strategic e ect dominated and permits prices were higher than marginal abatement costs. In the steady-state equilibrium, taxes led to overabatement while standards led to underabatement.
We u s e d n umerical optimization to compare prices and quantities and, in the spirit of Weitzman 12] , showed whether the comparison depends on the relative slopes of marginal cost and marginal bene t. In our model, which policy instrument is least distorting depends upon which rm sets the permit price. When the low-cost rm sets the price, taxes outperform permits in terms of welfare. On the other hand, when the high-cost rm sets the price, permits outperform taxes. For the parameters used, when taxes dominate they do so by a small margin. When permits dominate, they can dominate by a m uch larger margin (up to 15%).
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